Swarm Distributed Communication Security Specification (Post-Quantum & Anti-Hacking)

1. Overview

This document specifies the design and implementation of anti-hacking and post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) security for peer-to-peer (P2P) and ground control tower communications across UAV/AUV Swarm Control (uav_swarm_control), Multi-Domain Simulator (EvoMobilitySim), and Edge Client (EvoDeviceClient).

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2. Threat Model and Security Architecture

In distributed environments involving aerial (UAV), underwater (AUV), and ground vehicles interacting with central/edge control towers, the following threats are mitigated:

flowchart TD
    subgraph Threats["Cyber Threat Vectors"]
        T1["Node Spoofing / Sybil Attack"]
        T2["Message Tampering / Man-in-the-Middle"]
        T3["Replay Attack"]
        T4["Unauthorized Command Injection"]
        T5["Quantum Computing Cryptanalysis (Grover/Shor)"]
    end

    subgraph Defense["Security Architecture (Comm.security)"]
        D1["Mutual Node & Role Authentication (KeyStore)"]
        D2["Canonical JSON HMAC-SHA256/512 Integrity"]
        D3["Sliding Time Window & Nonce Cache (AntiReplayCache)"]
        D4["Control Tower Signed Advisory Enforcement"]
        D5["Post-Quantum Hybrid Guard Token (SHA3-512 Sponge)"]
    end

    T1 --> D1
    T2 --> D2
    T3 --> D3
    T4 --> D4
    T5 --> D5

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3. Communication Sequence and Verification Flow

The sequence below illustrates state uplink from UAV/AUV nodes and control command dispatch from ground control:

sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant A as UAV / AUV (Edge)
    participant C as Ground Control Tower
    participant S as SQLite Security Audit Store

    A->>A: Canonicalize JSON & Sign (HMAC-SHA256/512 + PQC Token)
    A->>C: POST /api/v1/swarm/state (with security header)
    Note over C: Validate Timestamp Drift (|Δt| <= 10s)<br/>Check Nonce in AntiReplayCache<br/>Verify HMAC Signature & PQC Token
    alt Verification Success
        C->>C: Ingest into AOI Read-Model
        C->>C: Generate & Sign Coordination Commands
        C-->>A: Return Response (HTTP 200 OK)
    else Signature Mismatch or Replay Detected
        C->>S: Log security_tamper_detected / security_replay_rejected
        C-->>A: Reject Payload (403 Forbidden or Non-Ingested)
    end

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4. Security Header Format

The security block is attached to all DeviceStateEnvelope, TrajectoryUpdateEnvelope, and CoordinationCommand payloads:

{
  "node_id": "uav-tokyo-01",
  "role": "aircraft",
  "plan_generation": 4,
  "battery_percent": 88.5,
  "link_quality": 0.94,
  "payload": {
    "area_id": "Tokyo Central AOI",
    "run_id": "run-20260916-001",
    "position": {"x_m": 120.0, "y_m": 250.0, "altitude_m": 65.0},
    "velocity_mps": {"x_mps": 12.0, "y_mps": 0.0, "z_mps": 0.0}
  },
  "security": {
    "version": "1.0",
    "key_id": "evospikenet-swarm-default-key-v1",
    "algorithm": "PQC-HYBRID-SHA256",
    "timestamp_ns": 1758000000000000000,
    "nonce": "9f8e7d6c5b4a3120efcdab8967452301",
    "sender_id": "uav-tokyo-01",
    "role": "aircraft",
    "signature": "3a7b9c1d2e3f405162738495a6b7c8d90123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
    "pqc_token": "a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f901a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d"
  }
}

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5. Post-Quantum Cryptographic (PQC) Resilience

1. Grover Resistance (Quantum Search Protection):
2. 256-bit and 512-bit symmetric secret keys guarantee at least \(2^{128}\) effective post-quantum security against Grover's algorithm.
3. Sponge-Based Lattice Guard:
4. PQC secret seeds mixed with message canonical bytes, timestamp, and nonce using SHA3-512 sponge constructions prevent tampering and forging.
5. Crypto-Agility:
6. Modular engine architecture supports drop-in transition to NIST PQC standards (ML-DSA / CRYSTALS-Dilithium).